A panel of Italian banks for the period 2006-2012 is used in this paper to examine LLP main determinants. Our analysis also focuses on the determinants of the sub-components of LLP, i.e. provisions associated to Bad Loans and Impaired Loans and Bad Loans and Impaired Loans Coverage Ratio. A specific analysis for cooperative credit banks is provided. We find that Loan Loss provisioning for Italian banks seems to be driven principally by non-discretionary behavior. Economic fluctuations, according to our results, do not play a significant role, nor do signaling and income smoothing. Provisioning strategies for cooperative credit banks also seem to be affected by collateralized loans.
Introduction
During the past five years, the Italian economy has fallen into one of the deepest recessions of the post-war period. The Italian banking system was obviously affected by this crisis. Bad loans have started to pile up. Increasing bad loans have a double effect: they reduce revenues and increase provisions (which further reduce revenues). As pointed out by Balla et al. (2012) "loan loss provisions have a significant effect on earnings and regulatory capital. Because loan loss provisions are at the discretion of bank managers, there is the potential for banks to provision more or less than necessary as a way to smooth their income".
In principle, loan loss provisions (LLP) must be used to cover expected losses; however, due to the discretionary behavior of bank managers, they can become an important tool to pursue goals that are different from a fair representation of the expected evolution of a bank's loan losses. In a situation characterized by an ample fluctuation of the business cycle, provisioning policy can be used to stabilize earnings and dividends.
For example, just recently the Bank of Italy has put pressure on the banking industry to correctly evaluate the viability of loans and to adequately provide for the increasing credit risk 1 . Indeed, data on credit provisioning show a non-homogeneous picture. The coverage ratio (the ratio of loan loss reserves to total bad loans - Table 1 ) appears quite different between types of banks. Table 1 . Loan quality: ratio of performing loans and non-performing loans to total lending and coverage ratios -December 2012 2
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TABLE 1. LOAN QUALITY: RATIO OF PERFORMING LOANS AND NON-PERFORMING LOANS TO TOTAL LENDING AND COVERAGE RATIOS -DECEMBER 2012
Prior theoretical and empirical research suggests three central reasons to explain managerial discretionary behavior: income smoothing, signaling and capital regulation. These motives, together with non-discretionary components and economic fluctuation, contribute to explaining provisioning policy.
A further aspect that may affect provisioning policy is the transactional or relationship approach to clients. As pointed out by Dewenter and Hess (2003) , these two approaches may yield different outcomes when banks evaluate doubtful loans: relationship banks may have better information on customers than transactional banks and therefore less risky loans (or higher recovery rates); on the other hand relationship banks may have a stronger incentive to "evergreen" loans stability of the bank's stock price by reducing earnings volatility. Other motivations behind adopting an income smoothing approach are to exploit the signaling power of a stable income (Ronen and Sadan, 1981) and reducing the perceived bankruptcy probability of the firm (Trueman and Titman, 1988) . Managerial self-interest incentives could also lead to income smoothing, as well as stabilizing managers' compensation over time, and minimizing the probability of being fired (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995) . Furthermore, from the supervisory authority's point of view, regulators are interested in reducing banks' pro-cyclical behavior. In other words, banks are asked to increase loan loss reserves during good times, and to draw resources from these reserves when the economy slows down.
Finally, transactional and relationship banks may behave differently when facing the decision to make provisions for bad loans. Due to the strict relationship with their clients, relationship banks may have a stronger incentive to renegotiate or roll-over doubtful loans compared to transactional banks.
Remaining in the field of banking, there is a vast literature regarding the use of loan-loss provisions for income smoothing purposes. Greenwalt and Sinkey (1988) find that regional banks are more likely to be involved in income smoothing behavior, while Ma (1988) shows that U.S. commercial banks used loan-loss provisions to smooth earnings, finding no relationship between loan portfolio quality and loan-loss provisions. Collins et al. (1995) also find a positive relationship between earnings management and LLPs, thus supporting the notion that banks smooth income over time to a firm-specific mean. Bhat (1996) demonstrates that banks are more likely to be involved in income smoothing practices if they are small and in poor financial condition. More recently, Anandarajan et al. (2007) show that Australian commercial banks are engaged in earnings management practices, especially if they are publicly traded. Fonseca and González (2008) , considering a cross-country dataset, find that the incentive to smooth earnings is positively related with developed and market-oriented financial systems but negatively related with banking systems characterized by higher levels of accounting disclosure, the existence of a supervisory framework, and by stricter restrictions on banking activities. Dewenter and Hess (2003) find that transactional and relationship banks differ in their loan loss provisioning and write off due to different incentives.
Finally, Curcio and Hasan (2013) explicitly examine the impact of loan loss provisions on bank lending. Shrieves and Dahl (2002) -analyzing the utilization of the discretionary accounting practice of Japanese banks during 1989-1996 -find a negative and significant relationship between loan loss provisions and year-on-year change in total loans. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that loan loss provisions influence credit cycles. However, to explicitly test the impact of loan loss provisions on the fluctuations of bank lending, the discretionary component and the non-discretionary component need to be distinguished. Indeed, the cyclical behavior of non-discretionary provisions should reinforce the cyclical nature of bank lending. On the contrary, the discretionary component, through the income smoothing behavior, may reduce the procyclicality of bank lending.
Methodology
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Loan Loss provisions could also be used for "capital management" purposes. Banks with a lower level of capital can use provisions to build up a greater reserve buffer. To measure the effect of managing regulatory capital we compute the deviation of the Total Capital Ratio with respect to 8 per cent, divided by 8 per cent ( ). A higher value of this indicator indicates a wellcapitalized bank.
Banks can also use LLP to signal financial strength. We use the one-year-ahead percentage change of to test "signaling hypothesis" ( ). We expect a positive correlation between and our set of dependent variables. Finally, the business cycle could affect borrower's ability to repay loans. Several empirical studies have found a negative and significant correlation between provisioning and (real) GDP growth. As a consequence of this, the percentage GDP growth is included in our analysis.
Model specification
We specify a set of equations in order to estimate the determinants of several endogenous variables related to provisioning. Equations (1) and (2) model the relationship between total LLP and the explanatory variables:
Since our analysis is interested in the impact of the collateralized loans on provisioning behavior, two equations with the two different variables are estimated separately.
To obtain a more comprehensive assessment, it can also be useful to model the sub components of loan loss provisions, i.e. Loan Loss Provisions on Bad Loans ( ) and on Impaired Loans ( ) and their relative determinants:
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3 The first variable considers only loans that are totally guaranteed, i.e. that are collateralized for the total amount of the exposition, while the second one contains loans that are partially guaranteed as well.
. The second one is the ratio of guaranteed loans to total loans is a high percentage of collateralized loans in its credit portfolio. As indicators, we choose two different variables. The first one is the ratio of totally guaranteed loans to total loans ( ). The second one is the ratio of guaranteed loans to total loans ( ) 3 . The second component of LLP, i.e. the discretionary one, is related to different management objectives. According to the "income smoothing theory", banks tend to decrease (increase) LLP when earnings are expected to be low (high). Following this approach, the sign associated to earnings could be positive or negative. If banks use provisions to smooth earnings, there should be a positive relationship. On the other hand, a negative sign should indicate pro-cyclicality. We use the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and loan loss provision over total assets ( ) as a variable to test the income smoothing hypothesis.
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Therefore, ten sets of equations are estimated for two samples: the full sample, containing all banks and the restricted sample, focusing only on cooperative credit banks.
Estimation of loan loss provisioning and coverage ratios determinants
In order to investigate the determinants of the loan loss provision and Coverage Ratios behavior in the Italian banking system, we use an approach similar to the one used by Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) and Packer and Zhu (2012) .
Data and descriptive analysis
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of Italian banks' balance sheets and income statements from 2006 to 2012. Data are provided by the Italian Banking Association (ABI) balance sheets database. We preferred to exclude balance sheets prior to 2006 due to changes in accounting standards implemented that year. In order to focus our attention only on commercial banks, we do not consider any other categories other than those (investment and trust corporations, consumer credit and finance companies). We also delete banks with less than four consecutive time series observations, in order to explore in a robust way the phenomena from not only a cross-sectional, but also a dynamic point of view. Outliers were excluded by eliminating the bank's observations for that year. Table 2 shows the number of banks present in the final sample, divided by year and by category (shareholders/cooperative credit banks). However, the final sample covers a significant part of the Italian banking system. CCBs represent a significant part of our sample. On average, 80
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Estimation of loan loss provisioning and coverage ratios determinants
Data and descriptive analysis
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of Italian banks' balance sheets and income statements from 2006 to 2012. Data are provided by the Italian Banking Association (ABI) balance sheets database. We preferred to exclude balance sheets prior to 2006 due to changes in accounting standards implemented that year. In order to focus our attention only on commercial banks, we do not consider any other categories other than those (investment and trust corporations, consumer credit and finance companies). We also delete banks with less than four consecutive time series observations, in order to explore in a robust way the phenomena from not only a cross-sectional, but also a dynamic point of view. Outliers were excluded by eliminating the bank's observations for that year. Table 2 shows the number of banks present in the final sample, divided by year and by category (shareholders/cooperative credit banks). However, the final sample covers a significant part of the Italian banking system. CCBs represent a significant part of our sample. On average, 80 per cent of banks in our dataset are cooperative banks. is the ratio of loss provisions on Impaired Loans over Total Assets. We are also interested in the determinants of the coverage ratio of Bad Loans
Estimation of loan loss provisioning and coverage ratios determinants
Data and descriptive analysis
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of Italian banks' balance sheets and income statements from 2006 to 2012. Data are provided by the Italian Banking Association (ABI) balance sheets database. We preferred to exclude balance sheets prior to 2006 due to changes in accounting standards implemented that year. In order to focus our attention only on commercial banks, we do not consider any other categories other than those (investment and trust corporations, consumer credit and finance companies). We also delete banks with less than four consecutive time series observations, in order to explore in a robust way the phenomena from not only a cross-sectional, but also a dynamic point of view. Outliers were excluded by eliminating the bank's observations for that year. Table 2 shows the number of banks present in the final sample, divided by year and by category (shareholders/cooperative credit banks). However, the final sample covers a significant part of the Italian banking system. CCBs represent a significant part of our sample. On average, 80 per cent of banks in our dataset are cooperative banks. (6) Where is the ratio of loss provisions on Impaired Loans over Total Assets. We are also interested in the determinants of the coverage ratio of Bad Loans ( ) and Impaired Loans ( ). These two indicators are an important source of information for the bank's reporting activity. We decide to model these alternative endogenous variables as follows: (7) (8) As in the LLP equations, the lagged dependent variable is included as an explanatory variable in the regression. Of course, due to the particular construction of the Coverage Ratios, we decided not to include respectively and in the equations.
Estimation of loan loss provisioning and coverage ratios determinants
Data and descriptive analysis
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of Italian banks' balance sheets and income statements from 2006 to 2012. Data are provided by the Italian Banking Association (ABI) balance sheets database. We preferred to exclude balance sheets prior to 2006 due to changes in accounting standards implemented that year. In order to focus our attention only on commercial banks, we do not consider any other categories other than those (investment and trust corporations, consumer credit and finance companies). We also delete banks with less than four consecutive time series observations, in order to explore in a robust way the phenomena from not only a cross-sectional, but also a dynamic point of view. Outliers were excluded by eliminating the bank's observations for that year. Table 2 shows the number of banks present in the final sample, divided by year and by category (shareholders/cooperative credit banks). However, the final sample covers a significant part of the Italian banking system. CCBs represent a significant part of our sample. On average, 80 per cent of banks in our dataset are cooperative banks. . These two indicators are an important source of information for the bank's reporting activity. We decide to model these alternative endogenous variables as follows:
Where is the ratio of loss provisions on Impaired Loans over Total Assets. We are also interested in the determinants of the coverage ratio of Bad Loans ( ) and Impaired Loans ( ). These two indicators are an important source of information for the bank's reporting activity. We decide to model these alternative endogenous variables as follows:
Estimation of loan loss provisioning and coverage ratios determinants
Data and descriptive analysis
As in the LLP equations, the lagged dependent variable is included as an explanatory variable in the regression. Of course, due to the particular construction of the Coverage Ratios, we decided not to include respectively
Estimation of loan loss provisioning and coverage ratios determinants
Data and descriptive analysis
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of Italian banks' balance sheets and income statements from 2006 to 2012. Data are provided by the Italian Banking Association (ABI) balance sheets database. We preferred to exclude balance sheets prior to 2006 due to changes in accounting standards implemented that year. In order to focus our attention only on commercial banks, we do not consider any other categories other than those (investment and trust corporations, consumer credit and finance companies). We also delete banks with less than four consecutive time series observations, in order to explore in a robust way the phenomena from not only a cross-sectional, but also a dynamic point of view. Outliers were excluded by eliminating the bank's observations for that year. Table 2 shows the number of banks present in the final sample, divided by year and by category (shareholders/cooperative credit banks). However, the final sample covers a significant part of the Italian banking system. CCBs represent a significant part of our sample. On average, 80 per cent of banks in our dataset are cooperative banks. 
Estimation of loan loss provisioning and coverage ratios determinants
Data and descriptive analysis
Estimation of loan loss provisioning and coverage ratios determinants
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The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of Italian banks' balance sheets and income statements from 2006 to 2012. Data are provided by the Italian Banking Association (ABI) balance sheets database. We preferred to exclude balance sheets prior to 2006 due to changes in accounting standards implemented that year. In order to focus our attention only on commercial banks, we do not consider any other categories other than those (investment and trust corporations, consumer credit and finance companies). We also delete banks with less than four consecutive time series observations, in order to explore in a robust way the phenomena from not only a cross-sectional, but also a dynamic point of view. Outliers were excluded by eliminating the bank's observations for that year. Table 2 shows the number of banks present in the final sample, divided by year and by category (shareholders/cooperative credit banks). However, the final sample covers a significant Therefore, ten sets of equations are estimated for two samples: the full sample, containing all banks and the restricted sample, focusing only on cooperative credit banks.
Estimation of loan loss provisioning and coverage ratios determinants
Loan Loss Provisioning and Relationship Banking in Italy: Practices and Empirical Evidence
Alessi M.; Di Colli S.; Lopez J.S.
118
JEOD -Vol.3, Issue 1 (2014)
Data and descriptive analysis
Empirical results
The empirical analysis is based on the estimation of generalized method of moments (GMM) using first differences (see Arellano and Bond, 1991) and orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover, 1995) regressions. Variables are in difference to control for unobservable bank's specific effects. Estimations are performed in order to obtain robust standard errors. Results for equations 1-6 are reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
The empirical analysis is based on the estimation of generalized method of moments (GMM) using first differences (see Arellano and Bond 1991) and orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover 1995) regressions. Variables are in difference to control for unobservable bank's specific effects. Estimations are performed in order to obtain robust standard errors. Results for equations 1-6 are reported in Tables 4 and 5 . Concerning the estimation results for equations (1) and (2), we find that total LLP are significantly correlated with the stock of NPL. As we expected, the coefficients are positive, and indicate that the cyclicality of Non Performing Loans influences provisioning via backward induction.
TABLE 5. ESTIMATION OF LLP DETERMINANTS -FULL SAMPLE -ARELLANO -BOVER

Dependent variable
Note: t -statistics in brackets. Arellano and Bond GMM two-step estimation. Lagged explanatory variables have been used as instruments for differenced equations estimations Concerning the estimation results for equations (1) and (2), we find that total LLP are significantly
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JEOD -Vol.3, Issue 1 (2014) correlated with the stock of NPL. As we expected, the coefficients are positive, and indicate that the cyclicality of Non Performing Loans influences provisioning via backward induction. Concerning the estimation results for equations (1) and (2), we find that total LLP are significantly correlated with the stock of NPL. As we expected, the coefficients are positive, and indicate that the cyclicality of Non Performing Loans influences provisioning via backward induction. The coefficient associated to Loan to Assets ratio ( ) is positive and significant at the 1 per cent level. This finding suggests that Italian banks make higher provisions when credit risk is higher, consistent with both the standard accounting principles and previous studies. Total LLP seems not to be affected by capital management purposes. In fact, the coefficient related to capital adequacy is not significant and very close to zero. As regards the income smoothing hypothesis, results appear to be inconsistent. Italian banks tend to reduce loan loss provisions when earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions increase, confirming the cyclicality suggested by the nondiscretionary variables. Otherwise, economic fluctuation and business cycles seem to not affect total provisioning, together with the signaling hypothesis. Cyclicality of Total LLP appears to be driven primarily by the bank's specific microeconomic factors, while the macroeconomic situation does not seem to play a relevant role.
The results for equations (3) and (4) are quite similar, but differ in some key aspects. Bad Loans ( ) and forward looking differences ( ), together with the Loans to Assets ratio ( ) have signs equal to the ones estimated for equations (1) and (2). The non-discretionary component seems to also be affected by the amount of guarantees on loans. Banks with a higher percentage of collateralized loans (partially or totally) are willing to set lower provisions on Bad Loans, due to the fact that they are less exposed to credit default and to the higher (expected) recovery rate. The contribution of earnings before interest, taxes and loan loss provisions is not trivial. The coefficient associated to this variable is negative and significant for both Arellano-Bond and Arellano-Bover estimations. Also in this case, the variation of GDP is not significant, nor is the Signaling variable.
Regressions for equations (5) and (6) suggest that the non-discretionary behavior component The coefficient associated to Loan to Assets ratio ( ) is positive and significant at the 1 per cent level. This finding suggests that Italian banks make higher provisions when credit risk is higher, consistent with both the standard accounting principles and previous studies. Total LLP seems not to be affected by capital management purposes. In fact, the coefficient related to capital adequacy is not significant and very close to zero. As regards the income smoothing hypothesis, results appear to be inconsistent. Italian banks tend to reduce loan loss provisions when earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions increase, confirming the cyclicality suggested by the nondiscretionary variables. Otherwise, economic fluctuation and business cycles seem to not affect total provisioning, together with the signaling hypothesis. Cyclicality of Total LLP appears to be driven primarily by the bank's specific microeconomic factors, while the macroeconomic situation does not seem to play a relevant role.
Regressions for equations (5) and (6) suggest that the non-discretionary behavior component is relevant for provisions associated to Impaired Loans. However, the forward looking indicator ( ) does not seem to affect the dependent variable, as is also the case with collateralized is positive and significant at the 1 per cent level. This finding suggests that Italian banks make higher provisions when credit risk is higher, consistent with both the standard accounting principles and previous studies. Total LLP seems not to be affected by capital management purposes. In fact, the coefficient related to capital adequacy is not significant and very close to zero. As regards the income smoothing hypothesis, results appear to be inconsistent. Italian banks tend to reduce loan loss provisions when earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions increase, confirming the cyclicality suggested by the non-discretionary variables. Otherwise, economic fluctuation and business cycles seem to not affect total provisioning, together with the signaling hypothesis. Cyclicality of Total LLP appears to be driven primarily by the bank's specific microeconomic factors, while the macroeconomic situation does not seem to play a relevant role.
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The results for equations (3 Loans ( ) and forward looking ( ) have signs equal to the component seems to also be affe percentage of collateralized loans Loans, due to the fact that they recovery rate. The coefficient associated to Loan to Assets ratio ( ) is positive and significant at the 1 per cent level. This finding suggests that Italian banks make higher provisions when credit risk is higher, consistent with both the standard accounting principles and previous studies. Total LLP seems not to be affected by capital management purposes. In fact, the coefficient related to capital adequacy is not significant and very close to zero. As regards the income smoothing hypothesis, results appear to be inconsistent. Italian banks tend to reduce loan loss provisions when earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions increase, confirming the cyclicality suggested by the nondiscretionary variables. Otherwise, economic fluctuation and business cycles seem to not affect total provisioning, together with the signaling hypothesis. Cyclicality of Total LLP appears to be driven primarily by the bank's specific microeconomic factors, while the macroeconomic situation does not seem to play a relevant role.
The results for equations (3) and (4) are quite similar, but differ in some key aspects. Bad Loans ( ) and forward looking differences ( ), together with the Loans to Assets ratio ( ) have signs equal to the ones estimated for equations (1) and (2). The non-discretionary component seems to also be affected by the amount of guarantees on loans. Banks with a higher percentage of collateralized loans (partially or totally) are willing to set lower provisions on Bad Loans, due to the fact that they are less exposed to credit default and to the higher (expected) recovery rate. The contribution of earnings before interest, taxes and loan loss provisions is not trivial. The coefficient associated to this variable is negative and significant for both Arellano-Bond and Arellano-Bover estimations. Also in this case, the variation of GDP is not significant, nor is the , together with the Loans to Assets ratio The coefficient associated to per cent level. This finding sugges higher, consistent with both the s seems not to be affected by capital adequacy is not significant and ve results appear to be inconsistent. I before taxes and loan loss provisi discretionary variables. Otherwise, provisioning, together with the sig primarily by the bank's specific m not seem to play a relevant role.
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JEOD -Vol.3, Issue 1 (2014) also be affected by the amount of guarantees on loans. Banks with a higher percentage of collateralized loans (partially or totally) are willing to set lower provisions on Bad Loans, due to the fact that they are less exposed to credit default and to the higher (expected) recovery rate. The contribution of earnings before interest, taxes and loan loss provisions is not trivial. The coefficient associated to this variable is negative and significant for both Arellano-Bond and Arellano-Bover estimations. Also in this case, the variation of GDP is not significant, nor is the Signaling variable. Regressions for equations (5) and (6) suggest that the non-discretionary behavior component is relevant for provisions associated to Impaired Loans. However, the forward looking indicator seems not to be affected by capital manage adequacy is not significant and very close results appear to be inconsistent. Italian ba before taxes and loan loss provisions incr discretionary variables. Otherwise, economi provisioning, together with the signaling hy primarily by the bank's specific microecon not seem to play a relevant role.
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10
The coefficient associated to Loan to Assets ratio ( ) is positive and significant at the 1 per cent level. This finding suggests that Italian banks make higher provisions when credit risk is higher, consistent with both the standard accounting principles and previous studies. Total LLP seems not to be affected by capital management purposes. In fact, the coefficient related to capital adequacy is not significant and very close to zero. As regards the income smoothing hypothesis, results appear to be inconsistent. Italian banks tend to reduce loan loss provisions when earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions increase, confirming the cyclicality suggested by the nondiscretionary variables. Otherwise, economic fluctuation and business cycles seem to not affect total provisioning, together with the signaling hypothesis. Cyclicality of Total LLP appears to be driven primarily by the bank's specific microeconomic factors, while the macroeconomic situation does not seem to play a relevant role.
Regressions for equations (5) and (6) suggest that the non-discretionary behavior component is relevant for provisions associated to Impaired Loans. However, the forward looking indicator ( ) does not seem to affect the dependent variable, as is also the case with collateralized loans. Provisions appear to be counter cyclical, as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient associated to the earnings. The risk component, given by the loans to assets ratio, has a lower (if compared to the coefficients obtained in the other equations) but significant effect. Table 6 contains the estimation related to the Coverage Ratios. For both and the respective order 1 autoregressive component has a significant effect. As regards the coverage ratio of Bad Loans, the coefficient associated to is not significant. In this case, the signaling behavior variable ( ) has a positive but relative small impact. The coefficient associated to Loan to Assets ratio ( ) is positive and significant at the 1 per cent level. This finding suggests that Italian banks make higher provisions when credit risk is higher, consistent with both the standard accounting principles and previous studies. Total LLP seems not to be affected by capital management purposes. In fact, the coefficient related to capital adequacy is not significant and very close to zero. As regards the income smoothing hypothesis, results appear to be inconsistent. Italian banks tend to reduce loan loss provisions when earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions increase, confirming the cyclicality suggested by the nondiscretionary variables. Otherwise, economic fluctuation and business cycles seem to not affect total provisioning, together with the signaling hypothesis. Cyclicality of Total LLP appears to be driven primarily by the bank's specific microeconomic factors, while the macroeconomic situation does not seem to play a relevant role.
Regressions for equations (5) and (6) suggest that the non-discretionary behavior component is relevant for provisions associated to Impaired Loans. However, the forward looking indicator ( ) does not seem to affect the dependent variable, as is also the case with collateralized loans. Provisions appear to be counter cyclical, as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient associated to the earnings. The risk component, given by the loans to assets ratio, has a lower (if compared to the coefficients obtained in the other equations) but significant effect. Table 6 contains the estimation related to the Coverage Ratios. For both and the respective order 1 autoregressive component has a significant effect. As regards the coverage ratio of Bad Loans, the coefficient associated to is not significant. In this case, the signaling behavior variable ( ) has a positive but relative small impact. the respective order 1 autoregressive component has a significant effect. As regards the coverage ratio of Bad Loans, the coefficient associated to
Regressions for equations (5) and (6) suggest that the non-discretionary behavior component is relevant for provisions associated to Impaired Loans. However, the forward looking indicator ( ) does not seem to affect the dependent variable, as is also the case with collateralized loans. Provisions appear to be counter cyclical, as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient associated to the earnings. The risk component, given by the loans to assets ratio, has a lower (if compared to the coefficients obtained in the other equations) but significant effect. Table 6 contains the estimation related to the Coverage Ratios. For both and the respective order 1 autoregressive component has a significant effect. As regards the coverage ratio of Bad Loans, the coefficient associated to is not significant. In this case, the signaling behavior variable ( ) has a positive but relative small impact. is not significant. In this case, the signaling behavior variable 10 per cent level. This finding suggests that Italian ba higher, consistent with both the standard accounti seems not to be affected by capital management pu adequacy is not significant and very close to zero. results appear to be inconsistent. Italian banks tend before taxes and loan loss provisions increase, co discretionary variables. Otherwise, economic fluctua provisioning, together with the signaling hypothesis primarily by the bank's specific microeconomic fa not seem to play a relevant role.
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Regressions for equations (5) and (6) suggest is relevant for provisions associated to Impaired L ( ) does not seem to affect the dependent loans. Provisions appear to be counter cyclical, coefficient associated to the earnings. The risk com lower (if compared to the coefficients obtained in th Table 6 contains the estimation related to the respective order 1 autoregressive component has a of Bad Loans, the coefficient associated to behavior variable ( ) has a positive but relativ has a positive but relative small impact. Table 6 . Estimation of Coverage Ratios determinants -full sample 10 seems not to be affected by capital management purposes. In fact, the coefficient related to capital adequacy is not significant and very close to zero. As regards the income smoothing hypothesis, results appear to be inconsistent. Italian banks tend to reduce loan loss provisions when earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions increase, confirming the cyclicality suggested by the nondiscretionary variables. Otherwise, economic fluctuation and business cycles seem to not affect total provisioning, together with the signaling hypothesis. Cyclicality of Total LLP appears to be driven primarily by the bank's specific microeconomic factors, while the macroeconomic situation does not seem to play a relevant role.
Regressions for equations (5) and (6) suggest that the non-discretionary behavior component is relevant for provisions associated to Impaired Loans. However, the forward looking indicator ( ) does not seem to affect the dependent variable, as is also the case with collateralized loans. Provisions appear to be counter cyclical, as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient associated to the earnings. The risk component, given by the loans to assets ratio, has a lower (if compared to the coefficients obtained in the other equations) but significant effect. Table 6 contains the estimation related to the Coverage Ratios. For both and the respective order 1 autoregressive component has a significant effect. As regards the coverage ratio of Bad Loans, the coefficient associated to is not significant. In this case, the signaling behavior variable ( ) has a positive but relative small impact. -3.4399 -3.4414 -0.9656 -0.9637 -1.8576 -1.8592 -4.9799 -4.983 -3.0183 -3.0123 -4.465 -5.4687 (p-value) Tables 7a and 7b , confirm that autocorrelation in first differences could not be considered as a major issue. Note: t -statistics in brackets. Arellano -Bond and Arellano -Bover GMM two-step estimation. Lagged explanatory variables have been used as instruments for differenced equations estimations Both Arellano-Bond and Arellano-Bover estimation techniques confirm that Impaired Loans coverage ratio tends to be counter cyclical with respect to earnings.
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Focus on cooperative credit banks
In this section, we focus our attention on a restricted sample containing solely cooperative credit banks. All the ten equations are estimated using the same econometric technique applied in the previous section.
Regression results for LLP (Total LLP on Bad Loans and on Impaired Loans) are illustrated in Tables 8 and 9 . -3.4399 -3.4414 -0.9656 -0.9637 -1.8576 -1.8592 -4.9799 -4.983 -3.0183 -3.0123 -4.465 -5.4687 (p-value) 
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Focus on cooperative credit banks
Regression results for LLP (Total LLP on Bad Loans and on Impaired Loans) are illustrated in Tables 8 and 9 . (1) and (2) are similar to the ones obtained for the Italian banking system, with the exception of Expectations on future NLP dynamic which, in this case seem to affect Total LLP for cooperative credit banks (the coefficients in both the regressions are positive and significant). At the same time, the coefficient associated with the earnings suggests, as in the case of the full sample, that Total Provisions are pro-cyclical and that the income smoothing hypothesis is not verified for CCBs either. Results for equations (1) and (2) are similar to the ones obtained for the Italian banking system, with the exception of Expectations on future NLP dynamic which, in this case seem to affect Total LLP for cooperative credit banks (the coefficients in both the regressions are positive and significant). At the same time, the coefficient associated with the earnings suggests, as in the case of the full sample, that Total Provisions are pro-cyclical and that the income smoothing hypothesis is not verified for CCBs either. Results for equations (1) and (2) are similar to the ones obtained for the Italian banking system, with the exception of Expectations on future NLP dynamic which, in this case seem to affect Total LLP for cooperative credit banks (the coefficients in both the regressions are positive and significant). At the same time, the coefficient associated with the earnings suggests, as in the case of the full sample, that Total Provisions are pro-cyclical and that the income smoothing hypothesis is not verified for CCBs either. Concerning Loan Loss Provisions on Bad Loans, we find that for cooperative credit banks they are negatively correlated with (totally and partially) guaranteed loans and positively associated to the ratio of Bad Loans over total Loans ( ) and to the Loan to Assets ratio, while there is no significant impact of the earnings. In particular, the guaranteed loans (totally and partially) have a higher impact on CCB LLPs on bad loans than in the case of the full sample, confirming the fact that one reason for lower CCB provisioning is a higher level of loan collateralization. Furthermore, earnings coefficients are significant (and negative) in the estimation of equations (5) and (6).
Finally, the equations for Bad Loans and Impaired Loans Coverage Ratio are estimated for the restricted sample (Tables 10, 11a and 11b). Concerning Loan Loss Provisions on Bad Loans, we find that for cooperative credit banks they are negatively correlated with (totally and partially) guaranteed loans and positively associated to the ratio of Bad Loans over total Loans ( ) and to the Loan to Assets ratio, while there is no significant impact of the earnings. In particular, the guaranteed loans (totally and partially) have a higher impact on CCB LLPs on bad loans than in the case of the full sample, confirming the fact that one reason for lower CCB provisioning is a higher level of loan collateralization. Furthermore, earnings coefficients are significant (and negative) in the estimation of equations (5) and (6).
Finally, the equations for Bad Loans and Impaired Loans Coverage Ratio are estimated for the restricted sample (Tables 10, 11a and 11b) .
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JEOD -Vol.3, Issue 1 (2014) they are negatively correlated with (totally and partially) guaranteed loans and positively associated to the ratio of Bad Loans over total Loans ( ) and to the Loan to Assets ratio, while there is no significant impact of the earnings. In particular, the guaranteed loans (totally and partially) have a higher impact on CCB LLPs on bad loans than in the case of the full sample, confirming the fact that one reason for lower CCB provisioning is a higher level of loan collateralization. Furthermore, earnings coefficients are significant (and negative) in the estimation of equations (5) and (6).
Finally, the equations for Bad Loans and Impaired Loans Coverage Ratio are estimated for the restricted sample (Tables 10, 11a and 11b). As in the case of the full sample, As in the case of the full sample, has a strong and significant autoregressive of order 1 component. Well capitalized banks do not appear to have necessarily lower Bad Loans Coverage Ratio. With respect to the national case, the amount of totally guaranteed loans seems to negatively affect . This negative relationship appears much clearer for CCBs. As in the full sample, the Signaling variable is positively correlated with the dependent variable, even if the size of the coefficient is close to zero. The negative relationship with is confirmed for the Impaired Loans Coverage Ratio ( ) as well. Given the similar result obtained for the Coverage Ratio of Bad Loans, it seems quite clear that cooperative banks which have a portfolio of loans with a higher level of collateralization tend to maintain a lower level of Coverage Ratios, due probably to the fact that credit default risk decreases in presence of loans that are totally guaranteed. This could (partially) explain the lower average Coverage Ratios experienced by CCBs with respect to the Italian banking system.
Estimation results also suggest that seems to be pro-cyclical with respect to the earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions (over Total Assets). 
Conclusions
This paper examines Loan Loss Provisions and Coverage Ratios determinants for the Italian banking system over a 7-year period (2006-2012), using financial statements and balance sheets from the Italian Banking Association database. We also provide an analysis for a sub sample of has a strong and significant autoregressive of order 1 component. Well capitalized banks do not appear to have necessarily lower Bad Loans Coverage Ratio. With respect to the national case, the amount of totally guaranteed loans seems to negatively affect As in the case of the full sample, ha component. Well capitalized banks do not appe Ratio. With respect to the national case, the amo affect . This negative relationship appears Signaling variable is positively correlated with coefficient is close to zero. The negative relationship with is ( ) as well. Given the similar result obtaine quite clear that cooperative banks which hav collateralization tend to maintain a lower level credit default risk decreases in presence of loans explain the lower average Coverage Ratios exper system.
Estimation results also suggest that earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions (ov . This negative relationship appears much clearer for CCBs. As in the full sample, the Signaling variable is positively correlated with the dependent variable, even if the size of the coefficient is close to zero. As in the case of the full sample, has a strong and significant autoregressive of order 1 component. Well capitalized banks do not appear to have necessarily lower Bad Loans Coverage Ratio. With respect to the national case, the amount of totally guaranteed loans seems to negatively affect . This negative relationship appears much clearer for CCBs. As in the full sample, the Signaling variable is positively correlated with the dependent variable, even if the size of the coefficient is close to zero. The negative relationship with is confirmed for the Impaired Loans Coverage Ratio ( ) as well. Given the similar result obtained for the Coverage Ratio of Bad Loans, it seems quite clear that cooperative banks which have a portfolio of loans with a higher level of collateralization tend to maintain a lower level of Coverage Ratios, due probably to the fact that credit default risk decreases in presence of loans that are totally guaranteed. This could (partially) explain the lower average Coverage Ratios experienced by CCBs with respect to the Italian banking system.
Estimation results also suggest that seems to be pro-cyclical with respect to the earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions (over Total Assets). The negative relationship with
As in the case of the full sample, has a strong and significant autoregressive of order 1 component. Well capitalized banks do not appear to have necessarily lower Bad Loans Coverage Ratio. With respect to the national case, the amount of totally guaranteed loans seems to negatively affect . This negative relationship appears much clearer for CCBs. As in the full sample, the Signaling variable is positively correlated with the dependent variable, even if the size of the coefficient is close to zero. The negative relationship with is confirmed for the Impaired Loans Coverage Ratio ( ) as well. Given the similar result obtained for the Coverage Ratio of Bad Loans, it seems quite clear that cooperative banks which have a portfolio of loans with a higher level of collateralization tend to maintain a lower level of Coverage Ratios, due probably to the fact that credit default risk decreases in presence of loans that are totally guaranteed. This could (partially) explain the lower average Coverage Ratios experienced by CCBs with respect to the Italian banking system.
Estimation results also suggest that seems to be pro-cyclical with respect to the earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions (over Total Assets). as well. Given the similar result obtained for the Coverage Ratio of Bad Loans, it seems quite clear that cooperative banks which have a portfolio of loans with a higher level of collateralization tend to maintain a lower level of Coverage Ratios, due probably to the fact that credit default risk decreases in presence of loans that are totally guaranteed. This could (partially) explain the lower average Coverage Ratios experienced by CCBs with respect to the Italian banking system. Estimation results also suggest that
Estimation results also suggest that seems to be pro-cyclical with respect to the earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions (over Total Assets). seems to be pro-cyclical with respect to the earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions (over Total Assets). ) as well. Given the similar result obtained for the Coverage Ratio of Bad Loans, it seems quite clear that cooperative banks which have a portfolio of loans with a higher level of collateralization tend to maintain a lower level of Coverage Ratios, due probably to the fact that credit default risk decreases in presence of loans that are totally guaranteed. This could (partially) explain the lower average Coverage Ratios experienced by CCBs with respect to the Italian banking system.
This paper examines Loan Loss Provisions and Coverage Ratios determinants for the Italian banking system over a 7-year period (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , using financial statements and balance sheets from the Italian Banking Association database. We also provide an analysis for a sub sample of cooperative credit banks. We investigate not only the determinants of Total LLP, but we also try to model and detect the main explanatory variables for Bad Loans and Impaired Loans dynamics. Along with the standard explanatory variable commonly used in empirical literature, we test the impact of guaranteed loans, as an additional factor included in the non-discretionary component of provisioning strategies.
For the empirical analysis, we perform the estimation with generalized method of moments (GMM) using first differences (see Arellano and Bond 1991) and orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover 1995) . 
For the empirical analysis, we perform the estimation with generalized method of moments (GMM) using first differences (see Arellano and Bond, 1991) and orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover, 1995) .
Empirical results suggest that the provisioning mechanism in Italian banks is mainly driven by non-discretionary behavior. Discretionary behavior of bank managers and the economic cycle do not appear to be relevant, as well as expectations about future potential losses and credit risk.
A specific analysis conducted on the sub sample of cooperative credit banks pointed out that their Loan Loss provisioning is less pro-cyclical than that of the full sample of banks; moreover, a higher level of collateralized loans, which can reduce credit risk and future losses, has a negative and greater (if compared with other banks) influence on the amount of provisions.
